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FIREARM DEATHS, GUN AVAILABILITY,
AND LEGAL REGULATORY CHANGES:
SUGGESTIONS FROM THE DATA*
GREG S. WEAVER**
INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1926 the story of a shooting incident involving
a Thompson machine gun appeared on the cover page of the Chicago
Tribune.1 That day, Al Capone went to a local hardware store and
ordered three of these weapons.2 Capone used the Tommy gun on
April 27th of that year in an attack against a rival bootlegger, James
Doherty.' These events launched an arms war of sorts among gang-
sters in Chicago that quickly spread to other cities.4 In what later
proved a critical mistake on the part of Capone, one of the three fa-
talities from this shooting was a prosecutor for the state of Illinois,
William McSwiggin.' Police raided Capone headquarters in retalia-
tion, during which time a federal revenue agent found a ledger that
would subsequently be used to convict Capone of tax fraud.6
Possession of the Thompson machine gun-a weapon capable of
firing .45 caliber bullets at a rate of up to twenty-five rounds per sec-
ond and deemed unsuitable for use by the Chicago Police Department
because of potential danger to innocent bystanders-was not in viola-
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at Learning from the Past, Living in the
Present: Patterns in Chicago Homicides, 1870-1930. November 17, 2000, Northwestern
University School of Law, Chicago, Illinois. I would like to thank the office of Alderman
Edward A. Burke of the Chicago City Council and the Municipal Reference Collection staff
of the Chicago Public Library for their invaluable assistance.
** Greg S. Weaver is Assistant Professor of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Auburn
University.
I ERIK LARSON, LETHAL PASSAGE: HOW THE TRAVELS OF A SINGLE HANDGUN EXPOSE THE
ROOTS OF AMERICA'S GUN CRISIS 131 (1994).
2 Id.
3id.




tion of the city's concealed weapon law.7
As will be shown, the incident described in the previous para-
graph is an example typical of the seemingly paradoxical attitudes
pertaining to firearms during the period. Even though possession and
use of firearms in the city were, relatively speaking, strictly regu-
lated, enforcement of these laws was generally lacking. For example:
five days before his death in 1924, Frank Capone was arrested for
violating the concealed weapon law of Cicero (a suburb of Chicago).
The presiding judge dismissed the case and returned the weapons to
Capone-commenting that he may need the firearms for the purposes
of protection.8
On the other hand, however, highly publicized and often glamor-
ized firearm incidents associated with Prohibition played an impor-
tant role in the passage of subsequent gun legislation at the local,
state, and federal levels. Following the "St. Valentine's Day Massa-
cre" of 1929, President Roosevelt proposed a bill that would regulate
the sale and possession of handguns and machine guns alike, but
these measures remained stalled in Congress until 1934.' That year,
prompted in part by the 1933 death of Chicago mayor Anton Cermak
during an assassination attempt on President Roosevelt"0 and the ac-
tivities of John Dillinger, Congress passed the National Firearms Act
of 1934.11 This legislation regulated the sale, manufacture, and civil-
ian possession of machine guns and other "gangster type" weapons.12
The 1934 act originally contained a provision to place stricter regula-
tions on the sale and possession of handguns, but it was removed be-
fore the final form of the statute passed. 3 A second key law, the
Federal Firearms Act of 1938, required that all gun dealers be li-
censed. 14  These laws provided the bulk of gun legislation in the
7 Jack Kelly, Gangster City, 46 AM. HERITAGE 71-72, (1995). See also RICHARD
LINDBERG, To SERVE AND COLLECT: CHICAGO POLITICS AND POLICE CORRUPTION FROM THE
LAGER BEER RIOT TO THE SUMMERDALE SCANDAL (1991).
8 LAURENCE BERGREEN, CAPONE: THE MAN AND THE ERA 109 (1994).
9 D. KIRK DAVIDSON, SELLING SIN: THE MARKETING OF SOCIALLY UNACCEPTABLE
PRODUCTS 57 (1996).
10 ROBERT G. SPINNEY, CITY OF BIG SHOULDERS: A HISTORY OF CHICAGO (2000).
11 DAVIDSON, supra note 9.
12 National Firearms Act of 1934, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236, 26 U.S.C. § 1132 (1934) (cur-
rent version at 26 U.S.C. § § 5801-5872 (1995)).
13 Id.
14 FRANKLIN ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE CITIZENS GUIDE TO GUN CONTROL




United States until 1968. In that year a number of firearms laws were
passed at the federal, state and local levels that increased restrictions
on the sale, transportation and possession of firearms. 5
The objectives of the present study follow a number of comple-
mentary paths: to explore Chicago gun homicides between 1879 and
1930, to outline significant developments in firearm laws in the city,
and to identify possible factors that influenced changes in the in-
creased availability of firearms. In doing so, gun homicide trends
during the period will be examined and viewed in the context of sig-
nificant events such a civil unrest, as well as the period of Prohibi-
tion.
I. FIREAR-M LAWS IN CHICAGO
In examining the development of legal restrictions on firearms in
Chicago, a number of interesting points emerge. In 1982 the city en-
acted some of the strictest controls on gun purchases and possession
in the country-particularly in regard to handguns. As of October
30, 1983, civilians were allowed to own handguns only if the weapon
had been previously registered with the city prior to the effective
date. Civilians were permitted to register rifles and shotguns, but the
only handguns that could be registered include those in accordance
with statute, or if done by an individual specifically exempted by the
statute-such as peace or correctional officers and persons licensed
to manufacture or sell firearms. There was much attention given to
the city of Morton Grove in 1981, when a ban on the possession of all
handguns was passed and implemented. 6
As noted by Lindberg, when the town of Chicago was formed in
1834, one of the first laws passed was a ban on firearms."7 While the
specific nature of this statute was unidentified, it provided the foun-
dation for a trend that continues to be followed. Three years later
when the city was granted a municipal charter, Section 1 of the Mu-
nicipal code of 1837 prohibited the discharge of firearms (the firing
of weapons containing blank cartridges was allowed at the discretion
of the Mayor or head of the Common Council, presumably for cere-
monial purposes) within a specified area of the city. The penalty for
this offense was a fine ranging between five and twenty-five dollars.
15 LARSON, supra note 1. See also National Rifle Ass'n, New U.S. Gun Laws Piled High
By Now, 116 AM. RIFLEMAN 43 (1968).
16 See CAROLYN REBECCA BLOCK, et al, GUIDE TO ILLINOIS FIREARM DATA, (1992). See
also CHm., ILL., CODE ch. 11 § 1 (1983).
17 LINDBERG, supra note 7, at 2.
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Furthermore, section 5 of the 1837 code regulated-primarily for fire
concerns-the storage of gunpowder. 9
That early restrictions were placed on firearms is rather interest-
ing, particularly when viewed in the context of state law. Illinois,
unlike several other states, had not yet placed restrictions on the car-
rying of concealed weapons.1 9 A number of states, beginning with
Kentucky in 1813, regulated the carrying of concealed weapons."0
Illinois, on the other hand, appears to have employed a different ap-
proach. In 1820 the state executed a duelist. 21 As such, many be-
lieved it was unnecessary to regulate concealed weapons because this
action (the execution) served to show that such actions would not be
tolerated, thereby serving as a general deterrent.22
Returning to laws in Chicago, the Municipal Code of 1849
placed additional restrictions on the storage and sale of gunpowder
and gun cotton. 3 However, the 1881 code reflects significant
changes in at least two areas. Sections 1215 through 1223 of Article
14 of the city code of 1881 not only prohibited the carrying of a con-
cealed handgun, but an added measure required a permit to carry a
concealed weapon. The concealed weapon permit was to be ap-
proved by the mayor and issued by the city clerk.2 4 In 1905 the con-
cealed weapon law was further strengthened to allow the city to con-
fiscate firearms possessed in violation of statutes.25 As such, these
modifications (particularly 1881) are in some ways similar to the of-
ten-cited Sullivan Law (1911) of New York, which made ownership
of a handgun illegal unless an adverse possession permit was ob-
tained from police.26 Events associated with Prohibition were defi-
I CHI., ILL., LAW AND ORDINANCES § 5 (1837).
19 CLAYTON E. CRAMER, CONCEALED WEAPON LAWS OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: DUELING,
SOUTHERN VIOLENCE, AND MORAL REFORM 47-48 (1999). Philip D. Jordon notes that under
the Ordinance of 1787, the "disorderly" discharge of firearms was prohibited in the North-
west Territory, which included restrictions on firing weapons in communities. PHILIP D.
JORDAN, FRONTIER LAW AND ORDER: TEN ESSAYS 12 (1970). Jordan further suggests that a
number of Midwestern states subsequently enacted statutes based upon this ordinance. Id
20 CRAMER, supra note 19, at 47-48.
21 Id. at 83.
22 Id.
23 Chi., Ill., Ordinance to regulate the Keeping and Conveying of Gun Powder and Gun
Cotton, reprinted in CI., ILL., CHARTER OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO AND AMENDMENTS WITH
RULES OF COUNCIL AND ORDINANCES 67-69 (1849).
24 CHI., ILL., CODE, ch. 14, art. XIV, § 1217-1223 (1881).
25 CHI., ILL., CODE, ch. 72, § 2454-2469 (1905).
26 Don B. Kates, Jr., Toward a History of Handgun Prohibition in the United States, in
RESTRICTING HANDGUNS: THE LIBERAL SKEPTICS SPEAK OUT (Don B. Kates, Jr., ed. 1979).
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nitely influential in the passage of federal legislation that at least in
theory increased firearm regulation. 2' By the early 1930's, the repu-
tation of Chicago was well established as a place where firearms
could be obtained easily. While the city did attempt to place restric-
tions on the sale and possession of firearms, many surrounding towns
did not, and laws were further weakened because weapons, ammuni-
tion, and accessories could be purchased by mail order.28 For exam-
ple, in 1922, law enforcement discovered that silencers could be pur-
chased by mail order.29
Clearly, legal restrictions on the ownership and possession of
firearms-particularly concealed weapons-increased during the pe-
riod. As noted previously, as early as 1813, states began placing re-
strictions on the carrying of concealed weapons." Because southern
states were primarily the first locations to do so, it has been argued
that one of the underlying motivations was to keep firearms away
from blacks and poor whites.31 In a similar vein, it is not surprising
that during the 1880's, attempts to enhance handgun restrictions in
Chicago coincided with the increased presence of immigrants and in-
stances of civil unrest. Specifically, there was concern among the
predominantly Anglo-Protestant establishment that immigrants and
anarchists would utilize firearms in subversive attempts to undermine
the existing social order.3 2 Some evidence exists that substantiates
these claims. For example, Peterson suggests that by 1886, approxi-
mately 3000 anarchists resided in the city-and that members of
these groups were often encouraged to stockpile weapons.33
In response to these concerns, it appears that many citizens con-
tributed supplies of both firearms and ammunition to the city for pos-
sible use in retaliation against individuals and groups deemed threat-
27 Id. at 22.
28 LEE KENNETT & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS OF A
NATIONAL DILEMMA 189 (1975). The authors note that following the formation of the Chi-
cago Crime Commission in 1919, an attempt was made to enforce more rigorously the city's
ban on carrying concealed firearms. Id. However, two subsequent court cases considerably
weakened the concealed gun law. See People v. O'Donnell, 223 I1. App. 161 (1921) (hold-
ing that permits issued in other Illinois cities must be recognized as valid in Chicago); City
of Chicago v. Thomas, 228 11. App. 65 (1923) (holding that municipal penalty for concealed
weapons conviction cannot exceed that authorized by the State).
29 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 202.
30 See National Firearms Act, supra note 12.
31 Kates, supra note 26, at 12.
32 Id. at 16-18.




ening.34 In 1877, upon hearing of incidents in Pittsburgh where mobs
successfully robbed gun stores and pawnshops to obtain weapons and
fearing similar occurrences in the city, the Superintendent of the Chi-
cago Police Department issued a request that gun dealers and pawn-
shop brokers secure store firearms.35 Many businesses complied, and
a number of merchants turned in weapons and ammunition to the city
for safekeeping. During the civil unrest of that year, a mob sur-
rounded a gun store on State Street, but it was dispersed by the Chi-
cago Police Department without incident. On the other hand, a gun
store located at 522 Halsted Street was robbed.36 The owner, M.J.
Privy, did not comply with the aforementioned request of the Super-
intendent and a large number of weapons-including those displayed
in storefront windows-were taken.37 However, it appears that the
Chicago Police Department realized some success in confiscating a
large number of firearms before they could be used. In an effort to
avoid further violence during riots occurring during 1877, the Chi-
cago Police Department confiscated 125 stands of government-
owned weapons that were stored at a hall owned by the McCormick
Company.3" At the time of the arrest of leaders of the Haymarket
Riot in 1886, a large number of weapons were secured as well-one
of many instances in which weapons were confiscated by law en-
forcement. 9
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER GUN AVAILABILITY
There is some debate over the extent to which firearms were
available to and accessible by the public, particularly during the nine-
teenth century. Inquiry into this matter is complicated further by the
difficulty of identifying specific sources of firearms. However, plac-
ing this question in historical context provides some clarification.
Prior to the 1830's, there were few guns produced domestically. In
fact, the federal government and state militias frequently were unable
to arm their troops adequately." During this time blacksmiths pro-
duced some of the firearms available, many of which were of ques-
34 See JOHN S. FLINN, HISTORY OF THE CHICAGO POLICE (1973).
" Id. at 165.
36 Id. at 164-65.
37 Id.
38 Id.
'9 Id. at 323.




tionable quality and also difficult to maintain." In particular, guns
made of iron were, without care, subject to rusting-which would in-
crease the potential for malfunction. Courtwright suggests that not
only was malfunction commonplace, but also that a greater number
of firearm deaths could be attributed to accidental shooting than to
murder.42 For the average person, firearms also involved a significant
financial investment, often several months' wages, an amount that
many could not afford.43
In addition to the importance of the Civil War in terms of its in-
fluence on the supply of weapons, this conflict also had an important
impact on attitudes relating to violence and the use of guns. Not only
did the war provide an opportunity for many to gain access to become
versed in the use of guns, but it also, from a cultural perspective, rein-
forced the notion that carrying a firearm was acceptable and/or neces-
sary.44 In that regard, these experiences served to desensitize many to
violence, particularly in situations when its use was perceived to be
warranted-such as in maintaining order or when one's honor or
reputation had been questioned.45 Coupled with dramatic population
growth and the social disorganization that accompanied it, that the
potential for violence increased should not be surprising.
46 While a
small portion of the post Civil War homicides were committed by
any of the estimated 26,000 Chicagoans who served during the war,
4"
the resulting impact on attitudes via culture should not be forgotten.
Peterson has suggested that circumstances particular to the city
prior to and following the war encouraged many persons to carry
weapons for protection.48 One of the many economic downturns ex-
perienced in the United States during the nineteenth century culmi-
nated in the Panic of 1857. Many of those experiencing unemploy-
ment turned to crime and Peterson states that "desperados, petty
criminals, and just plain riff raff" moved to the city.
9 Once the war
ended, many former soldiers came to Chicago, allegedly lured by the
41 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 39-40.
42 DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND SOCIAL DISORDER FROM
THE FRONTIER TO THE INNER CITY 37 (1996).
43 Kates, supra note 26, at 11.
4,4 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 152-53.
41 Id. at 151.
46 Jeffrey S. Adler, "My Mother-in-Law is to Blame, but I'll Walk on Her Neck Yet":
Homicide in Late Nineteenth-Century Chicago, 31 J. Soc. HIST. 253, 253-54 (1997).
" Id. at 265.
48 PETERSON, supra note 33, at 25.
49 Id at 34.
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city's abundance of gambling and prostitution establishments. As a
consequence, it appears that citizens began to arm themselves due to
fear of becoming the victim of a crime. "
Kennett and Anderson note that production of firearms increased
dramatically during the war.51 Improvements in technology made it
easier to produce better quality and smaller, more efficient guns at a
lower cost.5 2 Not only did production increase, but Union soldiers
were also permitted to keep their weapons after the war ended-an
important point, given that the Union used approximately four mil-
lion small arms during the war.53 After the conflict ended, the U.S.
government canceled all outstanding orders for firearms. In some in-
stances, the government sold surplus weapons back to the manufac-
turer for less than the original cost. A large number of these surplus
weapons were made available for sale to the public. Gun manufac-
turers, eager to reduce their inventories, dramatically lowered prices.
For the first time, firearms were within the financial means of many
Americans. 4
According to Marohn, between 1855 and 1895, there were very
few gunsmiths or powder/ammunition dealers in the city of Chicago.
By 1895 there were fewer than twenty each of gunsmiths or gun
dealers listed in the city directory. Recall from the previously cited
example involving Al Capone, however, that hardware stores sold
firearms, as well as department stores such as Sears and Montgomery
Ward, and sporting goods stores."5 In a number of instances large
manufacturers purchased small-scale producers and gunsmiths. It
was during this period that gun manufacturers and retailers began
utilizing newly developed mass media outlets to advertise their prod-
ucts in newspapers and other periodicals. These advertisements,
which frequently contained testimonials from satisfied customers,
could be found in a variety of print publications. Inexpensive and
cheaply made handguns, some referred to as "suicide specials" by
collectors, were standard fare. Initially, firearm manufacturers and
retailers hoped these ads would lure prospective buyers to local out-
'o Id. at 25.
51 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 91.
52 Id. at 97.
" Id. at 91.
54 Id. at 93; Kates, supra note 26, at 13. See American Firearms: Effect of the McKinley
Tariff, N.Y. DAILY TRIB., Sept. 12, 1892, at 4 (commenting on dramatic increase in produc-
tion following passage of the McKinley Act, which placed a tariff on imported weapons).




lets. However, it became apparent that the developing railroad sys-
tem and postal service made direct transactions possible, thus further
expanding the potential market.56
It was during the final decade of the nineteenth century that an
important yet controversial outlet for purchasing firearms made them
more accessible than ever before: mail order. While a number of
companies were involved in the sale of firearms via mail, Sears, Roe-
buck, and Company is generally regarded as being at the forefront of
this enterprise. In 1892, six years after the first Sears catalog was is-
sued, handguns were offered for the first time. 7 The one page layout
was devoted to a Smith and Wesson revolver.5 8 Over the next dec-
ade, firearms, ammunition, and accessories became featured items
and assumed a more prominent position in the catalogs. One year
later, the 1893 catalog devoted seven pages to firearms and accesso-
ries.5 9 By 1905, the apparent peak of mail order handgun sales for
Sears, six pages of the 63-page sporting goods section were devoted
to revolvers and ammunition.60 In fact, by this time Sears even
owned a factory that produced firearms and customers were permit-
ted to redeem profit sharing certificates for firearms.61
The sale of handguns via mail did, however, prove to be quite
controversial. For example, firearm manufacturers discovered that
Sears would frequently sell handguns for less than the retail price. In
turn, certain manufacturers (Winchester in particular) would attempt
to either limit sales to Sears or refuse to fill requested orders. Sears
responded by placing orders through dummy companies and this dis-
pute continued for a number of years.62
Secondly, that mail order sales were, in a manner of speaking,
anonymous, also proved controversial. Apparently, prior to 1915
Sears made no effort to determine if the sale of a firearm via mail
violated local statutes or if the purchaser possessed a permit (if re-
56 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 99. See also COURTWRIGHT, supra note 42,
at 43.
57 BORIS EMMET & JOHN E. JUECK, CATALOGUES AND COUNTERS: A HISTORY OF SEARS,
ROEBUCK AND COMPANY 35 (1950).
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 DAVID L. COHN, THE GOOD OLD DAYS: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MANNERS AS SEEN
THROUGH THE SEARS ROEBUCK CATALOGS, 1905 TO THE PRESENT 431-47 (1940); EMMET &
JUECK, supra note 57, at 37, 106 (the sporting good section consisted largely of firearms and
accessories).
61 EMMET & JUECK, supra note 57, at 77.
62 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 100.
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quired). That year, Sears began to request that the purchasers provide
their ages, occupations, and the names of two character references. 63
In 1922, however, Sears required proof of permit if required locally.64
Two years later Sears discontinued sales of handguns via mail.
While reasons for this decision included an apparent decline in sales,
the difficulty of complying with the increasing number of local re-
strictions on handguns and negative publicity were important as
well.
65
In sum, evidence suggests possible explanations for how the
supply of weapons increased in Chicago, particularly following the
Civil War. Be it from greater availability through advancing tech-
nology/production or weapons kept following the war, it does not ap-
pear that during the latter half of the nineteenth century guns could be
obtained if desired. In addition to outlets such as dealers, department
stores, hardware stores, and mail order, it appears that a secondary
market existed as well. Adler shows that weapons could be pur-
chased at pawnshops or even at saloons. In fact, there are recorded
instances in which guns were borrowed from saloonkeepers and sub-
sequently used in homicides.66
III. GUN HOMICIDE IN CHICAGO, 1870-1930
The discussion that follows is based upon analysis of the victim
file of the Chicago Homicide dataset (unless otherwise noted). In do-
ing so, total and gun homicide counts were identified and then aggre-
gated by year using Microsoft Excel and SPSS software packages.
63 COHN, supra note 60, at 441-42. Included is a Notice to Purchasers from the 1915
catalog, which reads:
We keep a record of the name, caliber and serial number of every revolver and pistol we sell, to-
gether with the name and address of the purchaser and the date of purchase. This record is open
at all times to any accredited peace officer. We solicit only the trade of responsible and reputa-
ble persons who have a legitimate right to purchase and own a revolver or pistol. We particu-
larly solicit the trade of policemen, sheriffs, constables, game wardens, forest rangers, express
and bank messengers and sportsmen of unquestionable character. To enable us to properly dis-
criminate in the filling of orders for pistols, we must insist that purchasers comply with the fol-
lowing requests: Give age. (We do not sell to minors). Give occupation. Give name of tow citi-
zens of your town as character witnesses.
64 KENNETT & ANDERSON, supra note 28, at 194.
65 COHN, supra note 60, at 442 (suggesting that newspaper coverage of homicides began
to use the phrase "cheap mail order pistol" with increasing frequency).
66 Adler, supra note 46, at 261; Jeffrey S. Adler, "If We Can't Live in Peace, We Might
as Well Die ": Homicide-Suicide in Chicago, 1875-1910, 26(1) J. URBAN HIST. 12 (1999).
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Then, rates for total and gun homicides for each year are calculated
using population data derived from Chicago Since 1840: A Time Se-
ries Data Handbook, compiled by Wesley G. Skogan. Please note
that non-census-year population data are linear estimations for the
respective years.
When viewed together, Figures 1 and 2 indicate the total and gun
homicide rates for each year, as well as a depiction of gun homicides
in comparison to the total homicide rate during the period. Overall,
the gun homicide rate follows the same general pattern as the total
rate-an overall increase that includes a substantial upturn following
1918. Prior to 1898, the gun homicide rate exceeded three (per
100,000 persons) during the years 1882-1894, at which time the gun
homicide rate fell below that level in only one year (1910) during the
remainder of the period. Following 1918, however, the
aforementioned upswing in the gun homicide rate reappeared. The
rate of 7.46 for 1919 dropped to 6.07 in 1920, but increased during
the following eight years, peaking at 11.51 in 1928, the highest gun
homicide rate of any year during the period between 1870 and 1930.









Gun Homicide Rate, 1870-1930




As stated previously, the period between 1870 and 1930 included a
number of significant events related to changes in the homicide rate,
including instances of civil unrest. During the latter half of the nine-
teenth and into the early twentieth century, several notable instances
of civil disturbance-most notably involving labor struggles-
occurred in many cities including Chicago. These events, coupled
with rapid population growth in the city, definitely influenced social
life in many ways, including increased violence. Two sets of circum-
stances are important. First, some incidents were associated with an
event itself, such as 1877, when thirty strikers were killed during a
railroad strike. 8 Second, in some instances, the impact of labor dis-
putes and struggles may have influenced violent behavior beyond the
event itself, straining relations between groups and facilitating a mi-
lieu that increased the likelihood of violence.
Particularly during the later part of the nineteenth century the
massive influx of immigrants was viewed negatively by the predomi-
nantly Anglo-Protestant establishment. For the most part, immi-
grants were viewed as anarchists intent on undermining the existing
social order. Added to this notion was the concern that stores of
weapons were being amassed for this purpose. In that regard it is
possible that increased restrictions on the possession of concealed
weapons were motivated by these concerns.69
In addition to the railway strike of 1877, the gun homicide rate
often increased during those years when key incidents occurred.
Surprisingly, one of the most notable instances, the McCormick
Strike of 1886, occurred as homicide rates experienced a brief de-
cline. The gun homicide rate also experienced an increase during
1893 and 1894, during which time the mayor of Chicago was mur-
dered and federal troops were mobilized in the city to end a strike
against the Pullman Palace Car Company.7" Between 1898 and 1905,
during another general upturn in the gun homicide rate, the city ex-
perienced the Stockyard Strike of 1902 and the Teamsters Strike of
1905. In 1902 National Guard Troops were mobilized during an in-
cident in which numerous injuries resulted. The 1905 strike was a
continuation of the former action, in which several conflicts between
police and strikers resulted in the deaths of fourteen persons.7
68 Matthew Taylor Raffety, Chicago, in VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 213-
16 (Ronald Gottesman, ed. 1999)
69 Kates, supra note 26, at 7-30.
70 Raffety, supra note 68, at 213-16; SPINNEY, supra note 10, at 107-213.
71 SKOGAN, supra note 67, at 103; LINDBERG, supra note 7, at 73-75.
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Following declines in the gun homicide rate during the latter half
of the first decade of the twentieth century, the city experienced a re-
versal in this trend. Over the following twenty years, the total gun
homicide rate in Chicago more than doubled.7" In 1911, the year of
the Garment Workers Strike, the gun homicide rate was 4.36."
However, influenced by conflicts related to control of labor unions
(primarily between 1911 and 1920) and Prohibition, the gun homi-
cide rate peaked (for the period) at 11.51, by 1929. 74 Perhaps the best
example of how tension between the groups can result in violence is
the race riots of 1919. An economic recession exacerbated by racial
tension contributed to the events of July 1919, when a young black
male was killed as he swam on a white-only beach on Lake Michi-
gan. This even triggered six days of rioting throughout the city.75 By
the time the National Guard was called in to restore order, thirty-
eight persons had died and thousands were injured.76
The preceding events, however, were quite overshadowed by
Prohibition, which began in January 1920. During the first year the
gun homicide rate was 6.07 and steadily increased during the decade.
With Prohibition came competition over the illegal alcohol market
and not surprisingly, violence followed. After 1923 when the tenu-
ous agreements between rival bootlegging gangs dissolved, a marked
increase in violence resulted as a consequence. 77 In 1926, for exam-
ple, 76 of the 575 homicides for the year were "gangland murders.
7
1
Figures 1 and 2 reveal a marked continuation of the increase in both
total and gun homicide rates through 1928. In addition to influencing
the passage of stricter firearm legislation, the St. Valentine's Day
Massacre of 1929 ironically slowed the continuation of increasing
homicide rates at the end of the decade. This event consolidated the
power of Al Capone and his organization.79 As a consequence, the
necessity of employing violence when dealing with rival gangs di-
minished.8 °
72 LINDBERG, supra note 7, at 73-75.
73 id.
74 id.
75 SPINNEY, supra note 10, at 172-74.
76 id.
77 Mark. H. Hailer, Organized Crime in Urban Society: Chicago in the Twentieth Cen-
tury, 5 J. OF SOC. HIST. 210, 210-34 (1971-72).
78 SPINNEY, supra note 10, at 177.
79 Id. at 177.
"0 Id. at 177-78.
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Figure 3 reflects the percentage of gun homicides for each year
between 1870 and 1930. For the entire period, the average percent-
age of homicides committed with firearms is 52.7%. As indicted on
the graph, there is greater fluctuation between 1870 and 1889. From
1890 to 1928, however at least fifty percent of homicides were com-
mitted with a firearm each year, excluding 1918, 1923, and 1926, in
which 46.5, 47.9, and 47.0% of the homicides, respectively, a gun
was used.
Also, viewing the yearly percentage of homicides committed
with a firearm in the context of the aforementioned instances of civil
unrest, labor disputes, and Prohibitions is quite telling. Generally
speaking, the gun homicide percentage increased in those years when
these events occurred. This finding suggests that the availability and
efficiency of firearms was acknowledged. For example, in 1877,
71.4% of homicides for that year involved a gun. In 1887, the year
following the McCormick Strike, this figure increased to 61.5% from
32.1% the previous year. Similarly, the gun homicide percentage is
higher in the years of the Garment Workers Strike (1911) and the
Race Riots (1919) than in the years previous to each event, respec-
tively. Furthermore, Figure 3 reveals that guns were utilized in at
least fifty percent of homicides that occurred in eight of the ten years
of the decade of the 1920's.
The relative consistency and stability of the percentage of homi-
cides committed with a firearm, when viewed in the context of
changes in the gun homicide rate is striking and raises a number of
important questions. Recall that between 1870 and 1930 the firearm
homicide rate increased approximately by a factor of 10-thereby
augmenting the importance of the previous discussion of the firearm
availability-and indicating, as suggested, that firearms became more
readily accessible over time.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
It is not surprising that as the homicide rate increased in Chicago
between 1870 and 1930, so did the homicide gun rate. As a conse-
quence, restrictions on firearms implemented prior to 1870 increased
during and after the period, but the effectiveness of these statutes re-
mains in question. Restrictions on firearms, particularly handguns,
increased during the 1880's and 1920's. The former may best be
characterized as a time of civil unrest that included a number of inci-
dents of violence. During the decade a number of labor disputes and
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strikes occurred. Likewise, the previously cited examples during the
Prohibition era were no doubt influential in the passage of increased
restrictions on firearms.
As mentioned previously, firearms became more readily avail-
able, particularly after the Civil War. The extent to which firearm
availability appears to have increased during this period is, however,
remarkable. Two key findings should be noted: first, that the per-
centage of homicides committed with a firearm remained relatively
stable during the period; and second, that the percentage of homicides
committed with a firearm generally increased in those years charac-
terized by civil unrest, as well as during the early years of Prohibi-
tion. The second finding suggests, given the high "stakes" associated
with labor disputes and control over the illegal alcohol market, that a
more efficient means of committing homicide was utilized-the fire-
arm.
There are a number of questions that should be addressed in sub-
sequent research. First, the relationship between firearms and homi-
cides occurring during specific events of civil unrest should be exam-
ined more closely. That is, in those years characterized by civil
unrest and a higher gun homicide percentage, how much of the in-
crease is related to the event itself? Doing so will help to clarify the
extent to which guns were utilized during protests, strikes, etc., and
also will provide valuable information on whether such events poten-
tially had a "lingering effect" exhibited by subsequent homicides.
A second area of inquiry involves specifically identifying
sources of firearms and determining the extent to which availability
increased. The increase in the supply of firearms appears to have
been a consequence of a number of factors. There is little question
that the development and utilization of technology made it easier to
produce weapons more efficiently and at a lower cost. Furthermore,
the Civil War not only increased the supply of available weapons, but
also provided an arena in which many were trained in their use and
arguably facilitated attitudes tolerant of violence. Finally, the ease of
the purchasing of firearms via mail order made them readily accessi-
ble.
Of course, the overall lack of information pertaining to supply
and availability of firearms makes this task more difficult, but a num-
ber of other possibilities exist and deserve exploration. Recall the
concern that immigrant groups were amassing weapons for use in
criminal and subversive activities. A number of examples illustrating
this point were identified, but it is difficult to determine the extent to
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which these weapons were used. Nonetheless, a number of possibili-
ties exist. For example, during the latter third of the nineteenth cen-
tury, the Clan Na Gael, comprised primarily of Irish Immigrants,
achieved a degree of prominence in the Chicago political structure. It
has been suggested that their activities also included providing both
money and weapons to groups attempting to liberate Ireland from
British rule. If true, what were the sources of these weapons and
were they sent to Ireland or did they remain in the city?81 Examples
such as this reflect the complexity of identifying specific factors, but
doing so would no doubt prove beneficial.
As noted previously, a general lack of information on availability
of firearms continues to present problems. During most of the period
in question little, if any, data was compiled on firearms. The Chicago
Police Department did not begin to record information on the number
of confiscated weapons until 1938.82 There are other avenues, how-
ever, that we should continue to explore. For example, in 1919, the
federal government for the first time levied an excise tax on sales of
both firearms and ammunition.8 3 Preliminary inquiries by this author
indicate that data on collections may be available at the national as
well as local level. Particularly in regard to the local level, this in-
formation, if available, would allow for comparison of Chicago to
other large cities in terms of sales of firearms and ammunition during
the last ten years of the period in question.
In addition, use of indirect measures of availability should be
explored. One such measure that warrants further examination is the
use of information pertaining to violation of concealed weapon laws.
Data obtained from the annual reports of the Chicago Police Depart-
ment to the City Council includes the number of charges annually for
violations of the city's concealed weapon laws between the years
1874 and 1930, as well as monthly data for 1875-78, 1882-83, and
1885-88.84 Unfortunately, data on arrest/convictions are available for
only a few of these years.
Preliminary analysis of this data suggests that in general, the rate
of being charged with violation of the concealed weapon statute de-
creased during the period. The most notable exception to this trend
appears to have occurred in 1892 and 1893, when rates per 100,000
81 LINDBERG, supra note 7, at 81.
82 BLOCK et al., supra note 16, at 28.
8' DAVIDSON, supra note 9.
84 CHI. POLICE DEP'T, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE TO THE CITY
COUNCIL (1874-1930).
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persons increased dramatically. Recall, however, that in 1893 and
1894 federal troops were utilized in ending the Pullman Strike. As
expected, it does appear that charges for these violations increased
during the period of unrest involving labor disputes and/or strikes.
Examination of monthly data reveals further that charges for viola-
tion of the concealed Weapon statute did increase in the months asso-
ciated with major incidents. While these rates fluctuated during Pro-
hibition, violations of concealed weapon statutes remained at the
lowest levels of any decade during the period of 1870 and 1930.
